
In 2024, I edited and published an anthology entitled Ultramontanism and Tradition: The Role of Papal Authority in the Catholic Faith (also available at Amazon sites), which features writings on this topic from an impressive lineup: Raymond Leo Cardinal Burke, Bishop Athanasius Schneider, Phillip Campbell, Stuart Chessman, Charles Coulombe, Roberto de Mattei, Edward Feser, Timothy S. Flanders, Rémi Fontaine, a Friar of the Order of Preachers, Matt Gaspers, Jeremy Holmes, John P. Joy, Robert W. Keim, John Lamont, Sebastian Morello, Martin Mosebach, Clemens Victor Oldendorf, Thomas Pink, Enrico Roccagiachini, Eric Sammons, Joseph Shaw, Henry Sire, Thomas Sternberg, Darrick Taylor, and José A. Ureta.
While, as expected, such a wide array of writers do not agree on every point, there is a remarkable harmony among their presentations, rooted, I believe, in their historical awareness and their theological commitment to objective principles of the Catholic Faith that preexist and control the exercise of any ecclesiastical office whatsoever—that of the pope being no exception. What is more, the authors probe how we can know when a pope has gone rogue and what can be done about it; why the “recognize and resist” position is coherent and correct, and the sedevacantist one false; and why the gates of hell cannot be said to have prevailed even when church leaders for a time fail to act according to their obligations.
Of special note are Feser’s long and brilliant piece on the death penalty debate, John Lamont’s already-classic essay “The Catholic Church and the Rule of Law” (found here in its fullest form), the vigorous three-way debate between Stuart Chessman, José Ureta, and Roberto de Mattei on how to interpret the history of ultramontanism (with Chessman offering a series of pictorial illustrations of the rise of papolatry), Sebastian Morello and Martin Mosebach on the “madness” of tying the role of the papacy to the “genius” or personality of its incumbent.
Having studied this area closely, I can truthfully say there is nothing quite like this volume out there—a volume in which the questions are pursued so deeply, so carefully, and so candidly, without the usual filters of “ecclesiastical correctness” or establishmentarian biases. The authors are completely committted to Catholic orthodoxy but are unafraid to face the good, the bad, and the ugly in church history and especially in the last pontificate, which tested many ecclesiological theories.
Today and next week, I will share favorite excerpts from the anthology. There’s obviously much more that I’d love to share, but in the interests of space, I’ve tried to keep each post under 5,000 words. Page numbers are indicated in parentheses.—PAK
Raymond Leo Cardinal Burke, “The Plenitudo Potestatis of the Roman Pontiff in Service of the Unity of the Church”
Regarding the term, supra ius, “over the law,” it was clear that the Roman Pontiff could dispense from the law or interpret the law only for the purpose of serving the proper end of the law, not to subvert the law…. “the pope must avoid decreeing anything that was sinful or might lead to sin or subversion of the faith.” (4-5)
In other words, the fullness of power was understood not as an authority over the very constitution of the Church or her Magisterium but as a necessity for the governance of the Church in accord with her constitution and Magisterium. (5)
[Quoting Watt] It was axiomatic that any power which had been given by Christ to His Church was for the purpose of fulfilling the end of the society which He had founded, not to thwart it. Therefore the prerogative power could only be exercised within these terms. Therefore “absolutism” (solutus a legibus) was not licence for arbitrary government. If it was true that the will of the prince made the law, in the sense that there was no other authority which could make it; it was also true as a corollary that, where this will threatened the foundations of the society whose good the will existed to promote, it was no law. The Church was a society to save souls. Heresy and sin impeded salvation. Any act of the pope in quantum homo which was heretical or sinful in itself or might foster heresy or sin threatened the foundations of society and was therefore void. (6)
[Quoting Watt again] If a member of the faithful believes in conscience that a particular exercise of the fullness of power is sinful and cannot bring his conscience to peace in the matter, “the pope must, as a duty, be disobeyed, and the consequences of disobedience be suffered in Christian patience.” (7)
Any expression of doctrine or law or practice that is not in conformity with Divine Revelation, as contained in Sacred Scripture and the Church’s Tradition, cannot be an authentic exercise of the Apostolic or Petrine ministry and must be rejected by the faithful. (15)
Phillip Campbell, “The Hyperpapalist Claims of Pope St. Gregory VII”
Like the old Roman god Janus, the papacy looks backward and forward in wielding power: it looks backward to precedent to find stable footing for its current actions, and it looks forward by pushing its inherited precedential boundaries, thus expanding the scope of action for future popes….
If the Church meekly accepts the expansion of authority accomplished under Francis, then this will create a precedent for future popes to claim these powers as part of the legislative patrimony of the Petrine office. It leaves the door open for future pontificates to reorder every facet of Catholic life according to whatever fads are popular at the time. In short, as awful as it is that Pope Francis should presume to outlaw the traditional Roman Rite, subvert religious orders’ autonomy, or sack bishops as if they are corporate middle managers, the long-term threat is that such deeds enter the stream of papal precedent—that a kind of historical consensus sprouts up that these are actions proper to papal governance itself.
But now, the other side of the coin: though papal power has grown by appeal to precedent, there have been occasions where papal overreach has failed to become precedent due to stiff resistance. (17-18)
There was significant, sustained opposition [to Gregory VII’s plan] from the European episcopate. This is irrefutable. (21)
Many of his [St. Gregory VII’s] more radical initiatives were abandoned by future pontiffs. His successors Clement III, Urban II, and Paschal II prudently stepped back from Gregory’s more outlandish propositions, having little desire to perpetuate the chaos of Gregory’s pontificate. We can see this, for example, in Alexander III’s prudently diplomatic approach to the dispute between St Thomas Becket and Henry II of England, in which he preferred negotiated settlements rather than risk an open breach with the powerful Angevin king. As for the teachings of Gregory’s pontificate, neither Dictatus Papae nor Propriae auctoritates passed into papal precedent. The documents do not appear in Denzinger, nor are they cited as dogmatic or canonical sources in Vatican I’s teaching on papal infallibility. The Church simply abandoned the documents and the ideology they represented. (21)
While theologians continue to delineate the theoretical limits of papal power…it is of utmost importance to make our opposition known to these actions now, before they enter the historical record as unresisted precedents. But more importantly, it is urgent that theologians and bishops in particular voice their protest. (22)
Thomas Pink, “Papal Authority and the Limits of Official Theology”
The immunity of papal legislation to “judgment” which Pastor Aeternus teaches is clearly an immunity to any “higher” juridical sentence. There can be no juridical appeal against it in any earthly forum. That does not mean, however, that all public criticism of it is forbidden morally, or even that it cannot be so morally faulty as to fail to impose a moral obligation to obey….
As Bellarmine took some trouble to explain in De Romano Pontifice, just as a valid legal directive of the state may fail to bind its citizens morally because of some defect in it, so too the faithful may fail to be bound morally by a valid but defective legal directive of the Church. The legal directive could be immoral and unjust; or it could simply be too damaging to the community to be morally binding on them. A legal obligation is not necessarily a moral obligation. (26)
The papalists insisted that their theology too could provide for remedy: not appeal to a juridically higher authority, for there was none, but the possibility of morally legitimate disobedience on a scale sufficient to disable an errant pope and block the execution of his decrees. (29)
Does the doctrine of indefectibility really preclude legitimate disobedience? How far really is the Church protected from failure? She may not be permitted to fail completely. But otherwise her guaranteed protection is hardly total. Loss of communion with the East, the Reformation, the collapse not only in Mass attendance but in vocations and the decline of catechesis in Europe and the Americas since Vatican II—all these have been allowed to happen, partly through the sins and mistakes of officeholders in the Church, popes very much included. If serious damage to the Church’s mission can occur through other means by which popes fail, why not through their legislative errors? The extent to which her own legislation can do serious damage to the Church’s mission, especially when complied with, is surely for the historical record to establish, not for appeals to indefectibility to prejudge.
There is a deeper problem with the appeal to indefectibility. What if the Church is sometimes to be preserved by God from failure precisely through open criticism by the faithful of her laws, and even by noncompliance? God might sometimes protect the Church from failure not by preventing very bad, even flatly immoral, papal legislation in the first place, but through raising up internal opposition to it when it does occur. (32)
Were the Church really infallible in her legislation then fallible magisterial teaching on faith or morals would be impossible. But such fallible magisterial teaching is possible…. We have by the 1920s an official theology supported increasingly only by appeal to its own authority and nothing more. (37)
Any Catholic who impeded the execution of the bull [Sancta Mater Ecclesia, 1584] was subject to excommunication. Happily, outside Italy at least, this law was generally disobeyed. (39)
We have here a not uncommon phenomenon within modern Catholicism—an exaggerated view of papal and ecclesial authority that depends on amnesia even about the fairly recent past. (40)
To reverse legislation that is defective and damaging one must ultimately appeal to truth, not to a constitution. And in a Church founded on truth, it must be truth that matters…. The only sure route to reversing the legislation is public and effective criticism of the underlying theology…. If the Church really can gravely damage her own mission by legislating in ways that violate morality directly—the impossibility of this, remember, was supposed to be especially obvious—we can hardly exclude serious damage to her mission from legislation that is defective in other ways. The legislative primacy of the pope serves unity—but a Christian unity that rests, ultimately, on truth. Truth will win the sooner if within the Church there is a culture that tolerates, even encourages, legitimate criticism of the exercise of papal primacy and especially of the theology on which that exercise relies. Without such a culture of open criticism, as history shows, the damage from bad Church law can be immense and last for centuries. (40)
Edward Feser, “Refuting the Hyperpapalist Approach to the Death Penalty Debate”
It is possible, then, respectfully to criticize magisterial acts without thereby meriting the label “dissenter.” How can this be? Wouldn’t anyone who disagrees in some way with a magisterial statement ipso facto be “dissenting” from it and thereby count as a “dissenter”?
The answer is No, because “dissent” in this context does not connote mere disagreement, but has a narrower, technical meaning. Donum Veritatis goes on to identify several marks of “dissent.” It involves “attitudes of general opposition to Church teaching,” motivated by “the ideology of philosophical liberalism, which permeates the thinking of our age.” For the dissenter, “freedom of thought comes to oppose the authority of tradition.” The dissenter “aims at changing the Church following a model of protest which takes its inspiration from political society.” In defense of his rejection of traditional teaching, he appeals to “the obligation to follow one’s own conscience,” the “weight of public opinion,” “models of society promoted by the ‘mass media,’” and the like. These sources of opinion lead the dissenter to conclude, for example, that “the Magisterium . . . ought to leave matters of conjugal and family morality to individual judgment.” And so on. Obviously, then, “dissent” involves, specifically, rejection of traditional Catholic doctrine, of the kind associated with liberalism and modernism and represented by theologians like Hans Küng and Charles Curran.
Donum Veritatis does not say more about the precise nature of the legitimate sort of criticism that it distinguishes from “dissent.” But it is clear that if “dissent” involves the rejection of traditional teaching, then a critic who upholds traditional teaching, and does so in the respectful manner demanded by Donum Veritatis, cannot justly be accused of “dissent.” In particular, those who have respectfully criticized the revision to the Catechism for giving the appearance of a rupture with tradition cannot justly be accused of “dissent.” That does not entail that Fastiggi cannot justifiably disagree with them. The point is just that, whatever one thinks of their position, it is not comparable to criticism of the Magisterium of the kind associated with the likes of Küng and Curran. (54)
Sometimes it is claimed that Donum Veritatis does not allow the public expression of even legitimate criticism, on the basis of its remark—typically quoted out of context—that “the theologian should avoid turning to the ‘mass media,’ but have recourse to the responsible authority.” But Donum Veritatis does not rule out public expression of such criticism, as is clear from several considerations. First, we need to consider the complete sentence from which this remark is quoted: In cases like these, the theologian should avoid turning to the “mass media,” but have recourse to the responsible authority, for it is not by seeking to exert the pressure of public opinion that one contributes to the clarification of doctrinal issues and renders service to the truth.
Relevant, too, is Donum Veritatis’s other reference to mass media, in a passage characterizing the tactics of liberal dissenting theologians: The weight of public opinion when manipulated and its pressure to conform also have their influence. Often models of society promoted by the “mass media” tend to assume a normative value. The view is particularly promoted that the Church should only express her judgment on those issues which public opinion considers important and then only by way of agreeing with it.
With this context in mind, it is clear that what Donum Veritatis is criticizing is not the mere publication of criticism in journals, magazines, or other mass media as such. Rather, it is criticizing the tactic of using mass media to stir up public opinion against the Magisterium, as a means of trying to force the Church to conform to the values that prevail in such media. (54-55)
The reason these popes were criticized was only because they failed to affirm traditional teaching, and that is the only reason Pope Francis’s revision to the Catechism has been criticized. The theological principles that justify such criticism would by no means entail that just “any magisterial teaching can be rejected.” Rather, they would only justify criticisms of failures to uphold traditional teaching. (57)
The development of Catholic doctrine is thus like a ratchet, which only goes one way. The body of teaching found in Scripture, solemn conciliar definitions, ex cathedra papal statements, and the ordinary Magisterium when it meets the conditions for infallibility, is locked in place forever. New implications can be drawn out of it (which is what “development” in the proper sense involves), but it cannot be contradicted or reversed (which would not be a true development at all, but rather a corruption of doctrine or failure to preserve the deposit of faith).
Now, it is precisely in order to assist the Magisterium in its function of preserving the deposit of faith that the teaching of Aquinas, of Donum Veritatis, and of the tradition more generally allows that there can be cases in which respectful criticism of magisterial statements is justifiable. Like the Magisterium, such criticism has precisely the function of maintaining fidelity to tradition, not of allowing the critics to say whatever they like. In short, and to oversimply, the teaching of Aquinas and of Donum Veritatis can never be used to justify “progressive” criticism of magisterial statements, but only certain kinds of “traditionalist” criticism. (58)
Yet another relevant papal statement is Pope Leo X’s condemnation of Luther’s thesis that the execution of heretics is against the divine will. Then there is Pope St Pius V’s promulgation of the Roman Catechism, which was, naturally, intended as a guide to living according to the principles of the Gospel, and directed to the Church universally rather than merely addressing some specific and contingent set of circumstances. This catechism enthusiastically endorses capital punishment for murderers, saying that “the just use of this power, far from involving the crime of murder, is an act of paramount obedience to this Commandment which prohibits murder.” In the twentieth century, Pope Pius XII taught that “it is reserved . . . to the public authority to deprive the criminal of the benefit of life when already, by his crime, he has deprived himself of the right to live.”
In our book, Bessette and I discuss these and other relevant papal statements on the subject of capital punishment at length. Now, if capital punishment really were inherently contrary to the demands of the Gospel, we would have to say that the Church has for two millennia consistently and gravely misled the faithful on a matter of fundamental moral importance. We would have to say that when directly addressing the question of whether the Gospel rules out capital punishment, popes Innocent I, Innocent III, and Leo X all got it wrong. Indeed, we would have to say that the heretics whom Innocent III and Leo X were criticizing were right, and the popes were wrong.
This is Fastiggi’s idea of upholding the authority of the Magisterium?! Which is more likely to reinforce the Church’s credibility: the view that Scripture and two millennia of magisterial teaching were right, and that Pope Francis’s revision to the Catechism is badly formulated and should be revisited in order to make it more clearly consistent with the tradition; or the view that the Church has gotten things wrong for two millennia, and that only Pope Francis has somehow finally seen the truth? To ask these questions is to answer them. (68)
John Lamont, “The Catholic Church and the Rule of Law”
Sexual abuse…is such a grave, widespread, and longstanding problem that it suffices on its own to establish that the rule of law does not exist in the Catholic Church. This does not mean that law is simply absent, a situation that is not really possible in any complex society. It means that law does not rule; it exists, but it is subject to the will of the people in charge of the society, rather than vice versa. (79)
The rule of law came to be abandoned because of the adoption of a tyrannical understanding of authority and a slavish understanding of obedience in the Latin rite of the Catholic Church. A tyrannical understanding of authority considers the rightful exercise of authority to lie purely in the will and command of the superior, and the corresponding servile understanding of obedience sees obedience as consisting purely in conformity to the will of the superior, rather than in obedience to the law and the underlying common good that produces, defines, and limits the power of a ruler. These understandings have rendered the idea of the rule of law in the Church undesirable and indeed incomprehensible for the clerics who have the charge of ruling the Church, and to some extent for all Catholics. (80)
St Thomas’s modified Aristotelian understanding of these notions was rejected, and replaced by quite different views that were largely of Scotist and nominalist origin. (80-81)
Obedience thus essentially consists in submission to the will of another. (82)
He [St John of the Cross] and his readers have taken for granted the fundamental opposition between the human and the divine will that is implied by liberty of indifference. (83)
This embodiment took place in the conception of obedience that came to be adopted by the Jesuits, and in the methods by which this conception of obedience came to be inculcated and enforced. (84)
An obvious objection to the Jesuit conception of obedience was soon raised. It was remarked that acceptance of blind obedience would mean that heretical priests and bishops could easily lead their people into rejection of the faith. St Robert Bellarmine’s response to this objection was that it was not a real possibility, because the preaching of heresy by bishops or priests would promptly be suppressed by the higher authority of the Holy See. This response of course required the pope himself to be incapable of heresy. The theory that the pope was not only infallible in his formal definitions of faith, but personally immune from heresy in virtue of his office, was accordingly first proposed in the Counter-Reformation, and argued for by Bellarmine. The claim that the pope was not only infallible in his formal definitions of faith, but personally immune from heresy in virtue of his office—first proposed by Albert Pighius in 1538—was accordingly argued for by Bellarmine. This claim met with opposition from sixteenth-century theologians, most notably Melchior Cano, Domingo de Soto, and Domingo Banez, but in the seventeenth century it came to be widely accepted. Suárez upheld it, as did St Alphonsus Liguori, who denied that the pope could be a public or even an occult heretic. (87)
The Jesuit conception of obedience was thus at the root of later ultramontane excesses, which appealed to the belief that the pope could not err in any way in matters of faith—a superhuman privilege that was easily extended to the belief that the pope could not err in any way at all. Papal cults of personality thus have their roots in the demands of this conception of obedience. (88)
An example of ultramontane rejection of the possibility of papal error is given by Fr J. Steiger, in his article “Causes majeures,” DTC 2:2039–40. Fr Steiger asserts that “rather than consider whether an arbitrary papal measure that would throw the Church into confusion would be invalid, theologians have preferred to consider that Christ would never permit such a disaster; history has shown their position to be correct.” This assertion would have been cleared by the editor of that standard work of reference. The fact that both these men could have forgotten St Paul’s rebuke to St Peter (see Gal 2:11) is astonishing, and may be an indication of the strength of the servile mentality induced by their clerical formation. (88, note 16)
Any reader of the Psalms will notice that they are full of what by Counter-Reformation standards is insubordinate language towards God; complaints, demands, criticisms, unsolicited advice, and reproaches. They are not compatible with a spirituality in which the Jesuit conception of obedience plays a central role. (91)
To a tyrannical understanding of authority necessarily corresponds a servile understanding of obedience, where the object of obedience is not the law as understood by the reason, but the pure will of the superior untrammeled by the will or intelligence of the subject…. By leaving the subordinate with no thoughts or desires independent of the superior’s will, it provided a means of thought control that surpassed anything described by George Orwell. It was no accident that totalitarian leaders such as Vladimir Lenin and Heinrich Himmler admired and emulated the Jesuits. (92)
For the great majority of Catholic priests and religious, the Jesuit conception of obedience and the Jesuit method of manifestation of conscience tended to produce the result that was stated as their goal: subordinates who believed that they owed servile obedience to their superiors, that they should surrender their will and intelligence to the people above them, and that in so doing they were doing God’s will and growing in holiness: and superiors who believed that their commands were the will of God, and that any resistance to these commands by their subordinates was rebellion against God himself. (94)
Like other writers, Rodriguez makes the usual exception for obedience to commands that are manifestly contrary to the divine law. But this exception is not something that has much practical reality. Internalizing and practicing the Jesuit notion of obedience is difficult, and requires time, motivation, and effort. When it has been done successfully, it has a lasting effect. Once one has destroyed one’s capacity to criticize the actions of one’s superiors, one cannot revive this capacity and its exercise at will. Following the directive to refuse obedience to one’s superiors when their commands are manifestly sinful then becomes psychologically difficult or even impossible.
There is an explicit appeal to the wisdom and goodness of superiors in this doctrine of obedience. This appeal however ignores the characteristic effects of the exercise of tyrannical authority, which are no less deep—perhaps deeper—than those of the practice of servile obedience. Such authority has an intoxicating effect, producing overweening pride and megalomania. Superiors in the grip of these vices become both prone to giving unjust orders, and incapable of conceiving of themselves as sinful or mistaken. (98)
The ruinous effects of attracting to the clerical state people who seek avoidance of adult responsibility, and the material security of passengers in a well-victualled ship, extend much farther than the overthrow of the rule of law in the Church. (98)
The laity were infantilized in the religious sphere of their lives. This infantilization can be observed in religious art and devotion, especially from the nineteenth century onwards, and in the willingness to give blind obedience to the clergy. It had of course a certain attraction; there is a comfort in relapsing into childhood in some sphere of one’s life, and handing over deliberation, decisions, and adult responsibility to one’s superiors. This attraction is the basis of the appeal of religious cults and totalitarian states. (100)
It was thus the literal, tyrannical understanding of St Ignatius’s writings on obedience that had come to be accepted by the Counter-Reformation Church. The enormous chaos that followed the Second Vatican Council is an indication of this acceptance. It revealed a widespread alienation from Catholic teaching and tradition among priests and religious, the majority of whom either gladly rejected what they had been taught to consider true and holy or left the religious life altogether. This was a consequence of identifying this teaching and tradition with the tyrannical regime under which they had been formed. The resulting hatred and alienation was greatly aggravated by the fact that this regime was largely incapable of communicating a real understanding of Catholic tradition in the first place, because such an understanding requires a mature exercise of intellect and will—precisely the things that religious formation was designed to extirpate. As a result there was little or no real grasp of the tradition to counteract the reaction against the generally accepted conception of it. Indeed such a real grasp often made a priest or religious suspect in the eyes of ecclesiastical authority, since it required this mature and independent exercise of thought and insight—as is the case with all substantial traditions.
As for the laity, their indoctrination in blind obedience made them willing and even proud to follow disaffected clergy when ordered to reject the liturgy and teachings that they had previously been told were sacred and inviolable. (100-101)
The alleged abrogation of the entire Corpus Iuris Canonici was itself of dubious legality, since the canonical tradition of the Church has always been considered to contain substantial elements of sacred tradition…. The 1917 Latin Code thus struck a severe blow at the rule of law in the Church. (102)
The key point is that in a clerical system dominated by these conceptions, the leaders all start off as followers themselves. In this capacity, they learn the skills of the slave for survival and advancement; flattery, duplicity, bullying and humiliation of those beneath them, and concealment. (103)
This in turn explains why the rule of law does not obtain in the Catholic Church; its leaders do not consider themselves to be subject to the law, and their followers do not see the law as the source of their leader’s authority or as a constraint upon the leaders’ actions. (103)
These forms of sexual abuse are closely connected with narcissistic personality types, and a social structure based on tyranny and humiliation both forms and selects for this type of personality. Psychological maturity is needed in order to successfully resist sexual temptation. By attacking this maturity, the inculcation of a servile understanding of authority makes chastity very difficult. (103-4)
Such activity will not be combated by the clerical leadership, because superiors will not think of their own authority as bound up with the authority of the law, and they will not be inclined to respect and obey the law as such. They will have a strong incentive to conceal sexual abuse, because the authority of the clergy over the laity rests on an infantilized conception of clerics as godlike father figures who can do no wrong. Such a conception is destroyed if serious wrongdoing by the clergy is made public. The laity who hold this conception will easily be persuaded or intimidated into silence about the cases of sexual abuse that they encounter. (104)
The acknowledgement and punishment of crime committed by a person in authority thus undermines the very basis of authority in a tyrannical regime—the opposite of its effect in a society ruled by law, where punishment of such a person strengthens the basis of authority by underlining that no one is above the law. (105)
Like other revolutions recorded by history, this revolt against tyranny [after Vatican II] did not lead to the triumph of freedom. Instead, it produced a more far-reaching and thorough tyranny, by destroying the elements of the ancien régime that had placed limits on the power of superiors…. The tools of psychological control and oppression that had been learned by the progressives in their own formation were put to most effective use, and applied more sweepingly than they had ever been in the past—the difference between the two regimes being rather like the difference between the Okhrana and the Cheka. (106)
Next week, I’ll share excerpts from the remainder of the anthology.—PAK








Great anti-hyperpapalism. When obeying a superior, you are always obeying a specific object, not just the man; which can be harmful.
One disagreement: abuse cover up is not about protecting authority, it's fellow abusers/§0d0mịte§ covering up for their own.
May God bless you Dr. K. and all the men who's work you edited.